Abstract -It is shown that a Boolean combining function f(x) of n variables is mth-order correlation immune if and only if its Walsh transform F(w) vanishes for all w with Hamming weights between 1 and m, inclusive. This result is used to extend slightly Siegenthaler's characterization of the algebraic normal form of correlation-immune combining functions.
A common form of running key generator for use in stream ciphers consists of n binary linear feedback shift registers (LFSR's) whose outputs are combined by a memoryless device, as illustrated in Fig. 1 . The Boolean combining function /(x1, X2,' ., x,,) generally is chosen to be nonlinear over the finite field GF(2) so as to increase the "linear complexity" of the resulting running key stream, i.e., to increase the length of the shortest LFSR that can generate this binary sequence.
Siegenthaler [l] has recently shown that several combining functions previously proposed in the literature can be broken by a ciphertext-only correlation attack. In subsequent work [2] Siegenthaler introduced the concept of mth-order correlation immunity for combining functions as a measure of their resistance against such correlation attacks. He also showed how, by iteration, to construct a limited family of m th-order correlationimmune combining functions for every m, 1 I m I n.
In this correspondence we characterize all mth-order correlation-immune combining functions for every m, 15 m < n, in terms of their Walsh transforms. We use this result to extend slightly Siegenthaler's characterization of the algebraic normal form of the combining function of correlation-immune combining functions. Let x=(x1, x2, ..., x, ) and o=(~i,w~,...,w,,) be n-tuples over GF(2), and define their dot product as x~o=x,w,+xp2+
II. WALSH TRANSFORM OF A BOOLEAN FUNCTION
... +x,w,,.
Let f(x) be any real-valued function whose domain is the vector space GF(2)" of binary n-tuples. Then the Walsh transform [3] of f(x) is another real-valued function over GF(2)" that can be defined as
where (here and hereafter) the sum is over all x in GF(2)" and x. w in the exponent is treated as the integer 0 or 1 rather than as an element of GF(2). The function f(n) can be recovered by the inverse Walsh transform f(x) =2?CF(w)(-1)"'".
(2) 0 Manuscript received August 14, 1985; revised December 22, 1986 . This correspondence was presented in part at the IEEE International Symposium on Information Theory, Brighton, England, June 24-28, 1985 where # {. } denotes the cardinality of the indicated set. It follows from (1) that
III. CORRELATION IMMCJNITY AND WALSH TRANSFORMS A binary [i.e., GF(2)-valued] random variable is said to be balanced if it is equally likely to take on the values 0 and 1. Siegenthaler [2] has defined the combining function f(x) to be mth-order correlation immune if the random variable Z = f(x,, x2,.. ., X,,,) is statistically independent of every set of m random variables chosen from the balanced and independent binary random variables Xi, X, , . . . , Xv. To see the implications of correlation immunity on the Walsh transform of f(x), we require the following result that we prove for an arbitrary discrete random variable 2.
Lemma: The discrete random variable Z is independent of the m independent binary random variables Y,, Y,; . . , Y,, if and only if Z is independent of the sum X,Y, + X,Y, + . + X,,Y,, for every choice of Xi, h,; . , X,,, not all zeros, in GF(2).
Remark: In our subsequent use of this lemma the random variables Y, , Y, , . . , Y,, will all be balanced; however, the proof of the more general result is as easy as that of this special case.
Proof: The necessity of the stated condition is obvious, and it remains only to show its sufficiency. Sufficiency is trivial for m = 1. Consider m = 2, and suppose that Z is independent of Y1, of Y,, and of Y, + Yz. This implies the following relations among probability distributions for every possible value z of Z with
where p, = P,((l) and p2 = P,*(l). It is easily checked that these 0018-9448/88/0500-0569$01.00 01988 IEEE four linear equations are independent and have the unique solu-follows that the probability distribution for Z = f(X) satisfies tion
Moreover, it follows from (3a) and ( In what follows, X,, X,; . . , X,, will always denote n independent and balanced binary random variables, X will always denote the random n-tuple [Xi, X2; . ., X,,], and Z will always denote the binary random variable f(X). Let W(w) denote the Hamming weight of the binary n-tuple w, i.e., the number of nonzero components in w. Then for any w + 0, the random variable w.X=w,X,+ ... + w,? X,, is a GF(2) sum of W(o) of the random variables Xi,. . . , X,. Because all 2" ' values x of X that give x.w = b are equally likely, it follows from (3a) and (3b) that f',,,.,(W) = 2-"+'N/d4> for w f 0
for b = 0,l. The relation (7) is the key to the following theorem, which is the main result of this correspondence. IV. APPLICATIONTOALGEBRAICNORMAL FORMS It is common in cryptology to work with combining functions expressed in algebraic normal form (i.e., in GF(2) sum-of-products form), namely, f(x) =a,+a,x,+ ... +a,x, + u12x1x2 + *. . + a12,,.nX1X2.. .x,.
It would thus be highly desirable to express the condition for correlation immunity in terms of the coefficients in the algebraic normal form of f(x). We now give some partial results in this direction.
We begin by expressing the coefficients on the right of (9) in terms of the Walsh transform F(o). Note that a, = f(0) so that (2) gives uo=2-"~F(c+ (10) 0 Next, let U(i,, i,,. . . , ik) be the vector space of all 2k binary n-tuples x such that x, = 0 when i 4 (i,; . . , i, }. Any product of j of the variables xi, x2,. . . , x? vanishes for all x in U(i,, i,; . . , ik) unless these variables all have indices in {iI;.. , ik}, in which case the product equals 1 for exactly 2k-j n-tuples x in U(i,; . ., ik). Thus (9) implies ujljz . ..ik= c f(x) (mod4 (11) xEU (il,...,ik) where here and hereafter we treat the values of f(x) as the real numbers 0 and 1, and we write (mod2) after an expression only when that expression must be equal to an integer and to mean 0 or 1 according as that integer is even or odd, respectively. Substituting (2) into (11) gives
. (12) 0 xEU(il....,ik)
Now if w has any nonzero component with index in { i,, . . , i, }, then exactly half of the vectors x in U(i,, . . . , ik) will yield 1.0 =l so that the second sum in (12) will vanish; otherwise, x.w = 0 for every x in U(i,; . ., ik) so that this sum equals 2k. Thus defining V( i,, . . . , ik) as the vector space of all 21-k binary n-tuples w such that wi = 0 when i E (i,; . ., i, }, we have from (12) 'rli2 ... tt
oEV (i,,,.,,ik) which is our desired expression. To relate (13) to correlation immunity, we note first that W(w) <n-k, if wEY(il;..,ik). (14) sum (13) will be that for w = 0; hence
However, upon noting that 2-"+kF(0) must be an integer for k 2 n -m and thus must be an even integer for k > n -m, we see that this relation is equivalent to
Institute for Microelectronics, University of Neuchatel, Switzerland, for pointing out that an assumption in our Lemma that r,;. ., Y, be balanced could be avoided. 
The necessity of (16), when f(x) is mth-order correlation immune has already been shown by Siegenthaler [2, theorem 11; the necessity of (15), i.e., that all coefficients of (n -m)th-order product terms must be equal, is new. Notice that the coefficients of all product terms of order n -m = 2 in f(x) are equal to 1. Day, 1967 , ch. VIII.)--private communication, Mar. 1986 . Rx.
Titsworth, " Optimal ranging codes," IEEE Truns. Space Elec., Tekm., vol. SET-lo, pp. 19-20, Mar. 1964. Example 2: The Walsh transform F( oi, w2, 03, 04) of f( x1, thus Z=f(X) is not balanced. When Z is balanced, (15) becomes Absfruct -The problem of designing sequences of Q-ary pulseposition-modulation symbols that have good periodic autocorrelation properties .is investigated. Two cases are considered. In the first it is assumed that only slot synchronization is present and thus cyclic shifts are one slot at a time; in the second PPM symbol synchronization is present, in which case cyclic shifts are by one symbol (Q slots) at a time. In both cases upper bounds are derived on the maximum peak-to-sidelobe distance, which are shown through a computer search to be nearly tight. When symbol synchronization is present, the bound reduces to the Plotkin bound, but it is slightly tighter in general. V. CONCLUDING REMARK Golomb [4] , who was apparently the first to consider Walsh transforms of Boolean functions, used this technique at the Jet Propulsion Laboratory (JPL) in the late 1950's for, among other things, the design of an interplanetary ranging system [5] . The objective then was to design a Boolean combiner for shift-register sequences of short relatively prime periods to produce a sequence whose period was the product of the component periods and which was highly correlated with each component sequence to facilitate the calculation of range. This ranging problem is virtually dual to the cryptographic problem posed by Siegenthaler [2] and considered in this correspondence; the interested reader can find details of the ranging problem in the work of Titsworth [6] . In fact, our results for m =1 (first-order correlation immunity) can be deduced immediately from the work of Golomb and Titsworth; the Lemma in this paper is needed, however, to extend the results to the general case where m > 1.
Sequences with "good" autocorrelation properties have applications in a variety of areas, including ranging, spread spectrum, and synchronization. The motivation for our work stems from previous results. on frame synchronization for the optical directdetection channel utilizing pulse-position modulation (PPM) [l], [2] . However, the general results derived herein are by no means limited to the optical channel, although they are of current interest for the latter where PPM has been shown to be optimal in a variety of ways [3]- [5] . Under PPM, information is conveyed by the position of a signal pulse in one (and only one) of Q subintervals (slots) dividing the symbol interval. This restriction will be referred to in the sequel as the PPM constraint.
